So, offering support to a sovereign state is not encroaching on a neighbouring state’s borders.
However, annexing a bordering sovereign state is per definition encroaching on another state’s borders.
Even if you do it with unmarked soldiers and officially state it’s totally not you doing it.
Doing the same thing openly, 8 years later with full military force is also illegal.
Correctly predicting an invasion doesn’t justify it.
Your thesis is impeccable from the point of view of international law and the normative (liberal) theory of international relations. It accurately identifies violations and tactics.
However, for a complete geopolitical picture, it must be supplemented by an analysis of the motives and strategic calculations of the other side (Russia), which, even if illegal, are the driving force of its actions.
Legal assessment and assessment from a position of strength are often in conflict, which is the essence of the modern geopolitical conflict.
The offers presents the expansion of NATO, and the west’s sphere of influence as a primary driver of Russia’s security concerns but then only briefly mentioned the significant liberal counter argument that NATO is a defensive alliance and does not require members to support offensive incursions. Against this argument the author simply responds that fear of a defensive alliance is still a valid security concern and therefore Russia was still justified in feeling it needed to invade Ukraine.
The standard liberal counterargument is that NATO is a voluntary defensive alliance operating on the basis of consensus. Article 5 of the Washington Treaty is only really activated in the event of an attack on one of the members.
However, this argument is unconvincing for Russia for several reasons:
- Past experience, as NATO’s military operations in Yugoslavia (1999) without a UN mandate were perceived in Moscow as proof that the alliance could act offensively outside its territory.
- Changing doctrines, as knowledge of the evolution of NATO’s doctrines after the Cold War, including operations outside the territory of the participating countries, allows Russia to assert that the initially defensive nature of the alliance has changed.
- Missile defense system, because the deployment of the American missile defense system in Eastern Europe, although claimed as protection against the threat from Iran, is perceived by Moscow as part of an offensive strategic potential that undermines its nuclear deterrent.
NATO is an alliance of imperialist countries that purely exists to terrorize and threaten countries into opening up their markets for western plunder. It destroyed Libya and Yugoslavia, and through Operation Gladio has terrorist cells. It’s just as much a “defensive” alliance as the Israeli “Defense” Force.
Russian people want democracy. Russia’s authoritarian government puts out a lot of big words to avoid talking about power structures. Is it really just irony that their favorite bogeyman: liberals is the same one American conservatives use?
The article I shared is about Liberal-Idealist paradigm in geopolitics, which is a very specific topic. However, let’s analyze your claims.
According to polls conducted by the Levada Center (an independent sociological institution recognized in Russia as a “foreign agent”), only about 16% of Russians support the Western model of democracy, while 50% advocate a “special Russian democracy,” which in practice often serves as a camouflage for authoritarianism. At the same time, only 5% believe that Russia does not need democracy at all.
However, low turnout in elections (for example, 48% in the 2016 State Duma elections) and indifference to formal institutions of power do not mean a rejection of democratic ideals as such. Many citizens do not see the connection between democracy and solving pressing problems (poverty, corruption, unemployment). In addition, state propaganda successfully creates the image of a “besieged fortress,” where democracy is associated with vulnerability to external threats.
The majority of Russians want not so much Western-style liberal democracy as social stability, justice, and respect for basic rights. Democratic institutions are perceived as a tool, not as a value in itself.
In Russia, “liberals” refer to supporters of the Western model of democracy, market economy, human rights, and pro-Western foreign policy. They are often accused of lacking patriotism and blindly copying foreign designs. In the United States, “conservatives” (especially of the libertarian persuasion) also advocate limiting the state, low taxes, and individual freedoms: for values that in Russia are associated with liberalism.
However, this similarity is superficial. American conservatism includes a strong component of religious traditionalism, support for a strong army, and anti-communism, which is unusual for Russian liberals. In addition, Russian “liberals” often advocate social guarantees and the role of the state in the economy, which brings them closer to American social liberals.
There is irony, but it is conditioned by a different historical and cultural context. In Russia, where the traditions of individualism and a limited state are weak, liberalism is perceived as alien and “Western,” while in the United States the same ideas are part of the conservative mainstream.
