Full disclosure, I have no idea if the Muslim concept of god applies to the Epicurean paradox. I’m much more familiar with the Christian version which presents god as perfect in an absolute sense.
a good creator wouldn’t allow their creation to suffer, or—taking it a step further—wouldn’t create a world where suffering is even possible.
Yeah there’s a degree of obscurity - for the sake of this conversation I’d be okay with defining evil as deliberate suffering. Step on a Lego > hurts > not evil. Stick a knife in someone or like commit genocide > very clearly evil. Idk if the former is technically incompatible with the Epicurean paradox, but we have no shortage of actual extremes to choose from, so might as well focus on those.
create a world where suffering is even possible. However, that would require human (or, really, lite in general) not to exist; give humans free will and suffering will happen.
Under the current laws of our universe, yes, but those are what are being scrutinized. The question this prompts is: is god not capable of creating free will without evil?
my answer is: I’ll drop (your conception of) the first pillar. God knows about suffering and is capable of stopping it but tolerates it for one purpose or another.
Needing to drop a pillar to make god work is the point of the whole exercise: a god that’s aware of evil and has the power to stop it, but chooses not to, is himself some degree of evil.
I’m much more familiar with the Christian version which presents god as perfect in an absolute sense.
Islam does too, but with less emphasis on the idea of benevolence. Most relevantly, Islam states that life is a test by God and therefore suffering is an inherent part of it, which is kind of my framework here (though I don’t assume that in my argument below).
Step on a Lego > hurts > not evil. Stick a knife in someone or like commit genocide > very clearly evil.
My point is that that’s logically inconsistent. A genocide killing thousands of people and an earthquake or famine killing thousands of people both leave thousands of people dead. Hell, even letting people die at all is suffering. Back to our postulates, pillar 2 states “his will is our reality.” When you get down to it, the only kind of world that would not run afoul of the Epicurean paradox would be a no-scarcity paradise with only 100% happy thoughts, and at that point we’d be looking at robots (or I suppose angels, if there’s a material difference), not humans. Worse, when you get down to it in such a world people would either lose the ability to even conceive of evil, or be prevented from committing it by an external force. Imagine if at the mall you always had an angel making you return your shopping cart, now multiply that by ten thousand times. Essentially we’re looking at a world of lobotomized robots, which to me doesn’t sound all that appealing.
is god not capable of creating free will without evil?
It might be possible in some outlandish alternate universe, but restricting the discussion to things we can conceive of, evil is baked into the concept of free will. As I argued above, take away the capacity to commit evil and you remove almost the whole breadth of human emotion and activity, by definition running afoul of free will. Perhaps most importantly, though
a god that’s aware of evil and has the power to stop it, but chooses not to, is himself some degree of evil.
at the core of this is the assumption that suffering is ontologically evil. This is very egotistical, but it also betrays a fundamental instability in the whole thing: Without objective morality (which immediately follows from the lack of belief in a creator), how can there be good and evil? This application of the Epicurean paradox assumes that evil can exist independent of a higher authority able to determine good and evil, so it’s a case of circular reasoning more than anything else. The Epicurean paradox can only be used to reject complete benevolence (which, well yes), not complete goodness.
My point is that that’s logically inconsistent. A genocide killing thousands of people and an earthquake or famine killing thousands of people both leave thousands of people dead.
Disagree - intent is an important factor if we’re talking about will.
If you stub your toe on your coffee table, there’s no ill will coming from the table. If I approached you and whacked your toe with a mallet, there would be ill will coming from me. In those cases, the outcome is the same, but you’d be silly to be upset at the table; but very justified in being upset at me.
So, take something like thousands of deaths from an earthquake: in a godless universe, it’s a shitty situation, but not an evil one. There’s no intent: the universe has no will. Throw an omnipotent and omniscient controller into the mix and suddenly that earthquake isn’t something that just happened as a result of planetary physics; it’s something that was intentionally designed to happen.
…which kinda makes sense that you’d think of them as being the same, since through a theocratic lens they kind of are, it’s just that ones a genocide at the hands of men, and the other’s a genocide at the hands of god. Either way, both are very much evil.
When you get down to it, the only kind of world that would not run afoul of the Epicurean paradox would be a no-scarcity paradise with only 100% happy thoughts, and at that point we’d be looking at robots (or I suppose angels, if there’s a material difference), not humans.
Agreed, hence my disbelief.
Running out of time, posting on mobile on lunch. I’ll hit the rest after work.
Full disclosure, I have no idea if the Muslim concept of god applies to the Epicurean paradox. I’m much more familiar with the Christian version which presents god as perfect in an absolute sense.
Yeah there’s a degree of obscurity - for the sake of this conversation I’d be okay with defining evil as deliberate suffering. Step on a Lego > hurts > not evil. Stick a knife in someone or like commit genocide > very clearly evil. Idk if the former is technically incompatible with the Epicurean paradox, but we have no shortage of actual extremes to choose from, so might as well focus on those.
Under the current laws of our universe, yes, but those are what are being scrutinized. The question this prompts is: is god not capable of creating free will without evil?
Needing to drop a pillar to make god work is the point of the whole exercise: a god that’s aware of evil and has the power to stop it, but chooses not to, is himself some degree of evil.
Islam does too, but with less emphasis on the idea of benevolence. Most relevantly, Islam states that life is a test by God and therefore suffering is an inherent part of it, which is kind of my framework here (though I don’t assume that in my argument below).
My point is that that’s logically inconsistent. A genocide killing thousands of people and an earthquake or famine killing thousands of people both leave thousands of people dead. Hell, even letting people die at all is suffering. Back to our postulates, pillar 2 states “his will is our reality.” When you get down to it, the only kind of world that would not run afoul of the Epicurean paradox would be a no-scarcity paradise with only 100% happy thoughts, and at that point we’d be looking at robots (or I suppose angels, if there’s a material difference), not humans. Worse, when you get down to it in such a world people would either lose the ability to even conceive of evil, or be prevented from committing it by an external force. Imagine if at the mall you always had an angel making you return your shopping cart, now multiply that by ten thousand times. Essentially we’re looking at a world of lobotomized robots, which to me doesn’t sound all that appealing.
It might be possible in some outlandish alternate universe, but restricting the discussion to things we can conceive of, evil is baked into the concept of free will. As I argued above, take away the capacity to commit evil and you remove almost the whole breadth of human emotion and activity, by definition running afoul of free will. Perhaps most importantly, though
at the core of this is the assumption that suffering is ontologically evil. This is very egotistical, but it also betrays a fundamental instability in the whole thing: Without objective morality (which immediately follows from the lack of belief in a creator), how can there be good and evil? This application of the Epicurean paradox assumes that evil can exist independent of a higher authority able to determine good and evil, so it’s a case of circular reasoning more than anything else. The Epicurean paradox can only be used to reject complete benevolence (which, well yes), not complete goodness.
Disagree - intent is an important factor if we’re talking about will. If you stub your toe on your coffee table, there’s no ill will coming from the table. If I approached you and whacked your toe with a mallet, there would be ill will coming from me. In those cases, the outcome is the same, but you’d be silly to be upset at the table; but very justified in being upset at me.
So, take something like thousands of deaths from an earthquake: in a godless universe, it’s a shitty situation, but not an evil one. There’s no intent: the universe has no will. Throw an omnipotent and omniscient controller into the mix and suddenly that earthquake isn’t something that just happened as a result of planetary physics; it’s something that was intentionally designed to happen.
…which kinda makes sense that you’d think of them as being the same, since through a theocratic lens they kind of are, it’s just that ones a genocide at the hands of men, and the other’s a genocide at the hands of god. Either way, both are very much evil.
Agreed, hence my disbelief.